Posted by Nydia Streets of Streets Law in Florida Child Custody
A Florida parenting plan must meet certain requirements specified in Florida Statute 61.13. For example, the parenting plan must contain a time-sharing schedule. This was an issue in the case Kiswani v. Hafza, 5D2023-2175 (Fla. 5th DCA February 14, 2025).
In this divorce case, a parenting plan was established by the trial court, but the former wife took issue with three things: (1) the lack of a specific time-sharing schedule; (2) delegation of judicial authority to a therapist; and (3) the court’s inclusion of steps the former wife needed to take to regain her time-sharing. The appellate court reversed on all three issues, discussing each in turn.
With regard to the lack of a specific schedule, the court held “Section 61.13, Florida Statutes, requires that the parenting plan ‘[i]nclude the time-sharing schedule arrangements that specify the time that the minor child will spend with each parent.’ § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2024). The parenting plan in this case does not describe which parent gets timesharing or establish a specific timesharing schedule. Because the language used did not meet the statutory requirement to ‘[i]nclude the timesharing schedule arrangements that specify the time that theminor child will spend with each parent,’ reversal is required.”
Next, with regard to delegation to third parties, the court held it was improper for the trial court to leave up to a therapist when and how the former wife would have contact with the parties’ child. The appellate court held “Although the trial court reserved authority to make the final decision on timesharing, that cannot happen absent a stamp of approval from third parties. This is impermissible. [. . .] Further, the language included in the parenting plan that the child’s therapist shall ‘determine if, when and the parameters’ of contact between Former Wife and the minor child has been specifically disallowed by this Court.”
Finally with regard to the former wife’s contention that the court impermissibly included conditions in the parenting plan for her to regain time-sharing, the court held “In C.N. v. I.G.C., this Court found that ‘section 61.13(3) provides a clear standard applicable to modifying parenting plans, including timesharing schedules, that neither authorizes nor requires the trial court to set forth the specific steps necessary to reestablish timesharing.’ 291 So. 3d 204, 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing Dukes v. Griffin, 230 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (holding that outside of satisfying requirements of section 61.13, courts may not set forth another way, or other steps, for parents to modify unsatisfactory timesharing schedules)). ‘Courts may not circumvent that standard by setting forth extra-statutory contingencies for modification.’2 C.N., 291 So. 3d at 207 (citing Cont’l Heritage Ins. Co. v. State, 981 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (noting that courts should not read additional requirements into statute)). Because the conditions in the parenting plan, adopted and incorporated into the final judgment, are impermissible, it is necessary that they be removed on remand.”
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